The Road to Power 1 – How we convey our Message

As Vanguard stated in issue 1, the National Front is Britain’s most popular party – it’s just that the public don’t realise that yet! Much of the public, as opinion polls show, agree with NF policies. To translate that into mass popular support what we have to do is to convey to the public a fairly simple message: “We, the NF, agree with you. We say what you think. We can turn what we say, and you believe, into a better reality we can all live in, if you, the public, will join us and help us do it.”

How do we get that message across? To answer that question, we have to look at how the public receive messages, how they find out what is going on in the world around them. In a classic piece of political analysis, the American racial nationalist intellectual Dr. William L. Pierce identified two “information nexuses” through which facts and opinions, not always clearly separated are conveyed to the people, the “central nexus” and the “local nexus”.

The “central nexus” is basically the national mass media. National newspapers, radio, the cinema, television. The central nexus is relatively new – national newspapers are at most 300 years old – and had little mass impact until general literacy became a reality at the end of the last century. Radio, cinema and the TV are all 20th century creations. The central nexus is, at most, no older than the oldest living Britons today.

Before that nexus existed, and alongside it today, is the “local nexus”. This consists of what people see for themselves, what they hear from people they know, what they find out from talking to people face-to-face, and, at the highest level what they read in immediately accessible local newspapers serving their own community.

Both nexuses, central and local, convey information to the people. Which one should we concentrate on in getting our information, our message, across?

In the past, the NF has concentrated overwhelmingly on using the central nexus, the mass media. Throughout the late Sixties and early Seventies the NF “crashed its way into the headlines.” Marches, demonstrations and stunts ensured that the name “National Front” was a household word.

By 1977 everyone knew our Party’s name and, in the most basic terms, what we stood for – if only “sending the Blacks back”. This was a vital, necessary political achievement, since without such use of the central nexus, the NF would have lacked the essential political credibility that comes from a well-established “brand name”.

However, in my view a strategy of getting our message across dependent, as the NF’s traditionally has been, mostly on the central nexus is now fatally flawed. It has, and had a decade ago, yielded the one certain return available – getting our name across.

But the next problem, brand image, what people having heard of us thought of us, lay outside our control as far as the central nexus is concerned. It depended on outside events – for example some African dictator deciding to rid his country of Asians and thus putting “race” in the news, and how those events were reported in the central nexus. For example the Ugandan Asians were portrayed by the media as a threat, as “ASIAN HORDE INVADES BRITAIN”, thus benefitting, in the short-term at least, the NF. The Vietnamese “Boat People” by contrast, were portrayed as helpless, hapless refugees deserving only of sympathy.

Finally, further gains from the central nexus depended also on how we were reported. In the early 1970’s the NF was generally reported in the media as “right-wing”, “anti-Immigrant” etc. As such, given a media “Immigration scare” the public stampeded toward us in great, and often somewhat indigestible, waves, so that even the quantity and quality of our membership became entirely dependent on outside influences beyond our control.

By the late Seventies, the media were portraying the NF less favourably as “neo-Nazi”, “fascist” etc. So the recruits dried up. This was partly our fault but it was also, very largely, the fault of the central nexus.

For the central nexus overlords, the media bosses, are no friends to racial nationalism, and were not prepared to be used by it. It has, after all, been the single great achievement of the central nexus, in its century of existence, to transform a basically healthy popular culture to the multiracialist Coca-Cola junk-culture of today.

It was, I would argue, ten years ago, that the NF should have ceased concentrating on the central nexus to put across our message to the public. For by doing so we were in the ludicrous position of someone who gives his worst enemy a vital message to deliver to his best friend. And then wonders why the message isn’t getting across!

What, then, is the alternative?
Clearly, the local nexus. Put simply relying not on Press headlines and TV stories but direct communication on doorsteps, via local newsletters, and in letters to local newspapers (who unlike national ones often actually print them) to get across our message to the people.

This method of putting our message across is less exciting and glamorous than marches and fisticuffs with politically irrelevant Marxist cranks. It involves lots of hard, boring work, but the advantages are overwhelming.

At last WE determine the message the public gets. Instead of our message being at best garbled into some sort of reactionary ultra-Toryism and at worst totally falsified as neo-Nazi cultist lunacy it arrives in the hands of the people in the same state it left the editors of NF national publications or local newsletters and the lips of NF members on the doorsteps.

Moreover, the public are more likely to believe that message. When information from the central and local nexus conflicts, the public generally believe the latter. “You can’t”, they say “always believe what you read in the papers”, but most people do believe what they have seen, heard, and assessed for themselves. One presentable NF member putting across a credible case on a doorstep confers immunity to a hundred Press smear stories.

Yet another advantage of using the local nexus is that it controls recruitment, and sometimes reduces it. This may sound a strange advantage, but what I mean is that the number of recruits gained, being proportional to the number of doorsteps knocked on, rather than to the number of race scare stories in the Sun, is therefore proportional to the number of doorstep knockers. And thus to the ability of the local branch to assimilate, train and turn into doorstep knockers such recruits.

We get steady, sustained growth, with the flow of recruits increasing only in proportion to the ability of the Party to assimilate them. Eventually, of course, our sheer size will generate media publicity in itself – but it also gives the Party at least some real power to control it.

The final advantage of concentrating on the local nexus to put across our message is perhaps the most persuasive. It works! Whenever the NF has broken through to win real mass support – in West Bromwich in 1973, Newham in 1974, Leicester in 1977 and, increasingly, in the West Midlands today – the key factor standing out is that the Party locally has got stuck into the local nexus.

It has hammered on doors, pushed local issues, written to local papers, put out locally-produced, locally relevant newsletters and leaflets and generally dug into the local community.

Now we know what we’re doing, we can, not just break through, but stay through, and build our strongest citadel in the hearts and minds of our people.

Click here to read The Road to Power Part 2 – The Ladder Strategy, first published in Vanguard, November 1987.

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